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CASE STUDY Open Access
Selective versus comprehensive emergency
management in Korea
Kyoo-Man Ha1* and Hyeon-Mun Oh2
Abstract
In spite of Korean governments’ efforts, many emergency management practitioners wonder whether what is
actually being practiced is selective or comprehensive management. Using a qualitative content analysis and
experiences in practice, the article analyzes the barriers to selective emergency management and the paths to
comprehensive emergency management via the same three management elements: stakeholders, phases of the
emergency management lifecycle, and hazards and impacts. Four analytical levels are considered: central
government level, industry level, community level, and household level. Korea, despite its self-praise, has to
transform its selective emergency management into comprehensive emergency management in time.
Keywords: Government; Industry; Community; Household; Culture
Introduction
Officials of the South Korean (hereinafter Korean) govern-
ment have recently and frequently boasted that Korea has
made considerable progress in implementing comprehensive
emergency management. They have officially proclaimed
that Korea has improved many aspects of comprehensive
emergency management, such as all stakeholders, the four
phases of the emergency management lifecycle, and all
hazards and related impacts, at every level. However,
many emergency management practitioners wonder
whether what is actually being practiced is selective or
comprehensive management, considering that there is
room for improvement in terms of comprehensive emer-
gency management. For example, the ferry Sewol sank on
April 16, 2014 and then no individual or institution
reacted to the initial phase of disaster response. Further,
only 172 out of 476 passengers were rescued and thus the
nation argues the necessity of setting up the national
emergency operation framework (MOSPA, 2014). Therefore,
it is necessary to study, as a major research question,
whether or not Korea has really progressed in comprehen-
sive emergency management.
This study aims to substantially facilitate the adoption
of comprehensive emergency management in Korea by
examining barriers to the current selective emergency man-
agement and suggest ways to achieve comprehensive emer-
gency management. Both qualitative content analysis and
practice experiences are utilized as major methodologies to
collect information and data on the two types of manage-
ment. In so doing, this article systematically compares the
two emergency management types via the same three major
elements, namely, stakeholders, phases of the emergency
management lifecycle, and hazards and impacts, at four
analytical units: central government level, industry level,
community level, and household level. This article will
emphasize that Korea must transform its selective emer-
gency management to comprehensive emergency manage-
ment in time, as a major tenet.
Theoretical overview
Concept comparison between selective and comprehensive
emergency management
Two kinds of emergency management are discussed in this
article: selective emergency management and comprehen-
sive emergency management. They are opposite concepts
in terms of the entire direction of emergency management.
Selective emergency management, which is newly named
here, is a traditional type, whereas comprehensive emer-
gency management, which is being widely practiced, is a
modern type (FEMA, 2010b: 2.5–2.6; Zessin, 2006: 8–9).
An increasing number of organizations have tried to utilize
comprehensive emergency management, but many still rely
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on selective emergency management under their own
limited environments.
The term ‘selective’ means having the power or function
of selecting. Selective emergency management means that
its components are not comprehensive but selective.
Among so many emergency issues, selective emergency
management tends to apply for the participation of selective
stakeholders in the process of emergency management,
unequal support for selective phases of emergency manage-
ment lifecycle, and inclusion of selective hazards and
impacts into emergency management. In other words,
selective emergency management comes to happen for
the goal of managing not all issues but some imminent is-
sues in the field, because of bounded personnel, resources,
and strategies. However, it is also true that the some cases
of emergency management strategically rely on selective
emergency management, though they have abundant
personnel and resources. Related groups wrongfully be-
lieve that selective emergency management is more effect-
ive for the goal of emergency management than other
measures.
Because selective emergency management does not play
a role in reliably predicting or preventing a new emer-
gency, it provides poor management. Nevertheless, select-
ive emergency management has its own benefits. For
example, it decreases financial costs. When the compre-
hensive aspect of emergency management is not depended
on, selective emergency management significantly cuts
financial costs (Conrad, Patton, Parikshak, and Kralovich,
2003: 268–272). However, such savings are not oriented
for long-term but for short-term benefit.
Some nations have heavily utilized selective emergency
management in the international community, according to a
literature review. More accurately, they have not had much
choice but to depend on selective emergency management
under their own critical emergency environments. For
example, government has played almost every role in man-
aging emergencies in Nigeria, particularly without the
support of its business corporations, voluntary organizations,
and other entities. As a result, oil pipeline disasters have
frequently occurred in the country. Without the support of
other stakeholders, government alone could not properly
prevent oil pipeline disasters (Onuoha, 2009: 384–386).
In India, poor coordination between government insti-
tutions and non-governmental organizations (NGO) led
to serious corruption of relief operations, government’s
misuse of funds, and inefficiency of emergency distribu-
tion system in 1999. In short, the lack of NGO activities
led to selective emergency management (Thomalla and
Schmuck, 2004: 380–381). In Iran, the nursing training
program was selective, considering that nurses failed to
update their information and skills periodically. Without
an updated training program, which is the phase of emer-
gency mitigation, nurses committed more mistakes in real
situations in 2003 (Nasrabadi, Naji, Mirzabeigi, and
Dadbakhs, 2007: 15–16).
Some hospital programs in the United States were based
on selective emergency management, specifically through
their emergency planning, and as a result such programs
could not achieve their targeted goals (Drezner, Courson,
Roberts, Mosesso, Link, and Maron, 2007: 148–154). In
addition, because emergency psychology programs in some
areas lacked a systematic set of helping actions, emergency
responders failed to recover from post-traumatic distress.
Such programs should have included a broader spectrum
of related needs and problems (Ruzek, Brymer, Jacobs,
Layne, Vernberg, and Watson, 2007: 30–33). The above
two cases show that the United States also had a selective
problem with the phases of emergency preparedness/
recovery.
On the other hand, the term ‘comprehensive’ means
involving or covering a lot of area. Comprehensive emer-
gency management therefore means that its components
are comprehensive, that is, comprehensive emergency
management supports the importance of all stakeholders
participating in emergency management, equally supports
all phases of the emergency management lifecycle, and
covers all hazards and impacts in emergency management,
contrary to what happens in selective emergency manage-
ment (FEMA. 2010a: 1.8–1.9; Laidlaw, Spennemann, and
Allan, 2008: 71–75).
Comprehensive emergency management does not deal
with only one side of emergency management. Rather, it
deals with every side of emergency management, including
not only the demand side but also the supply side (Erickson,
Champion, Klein, Ross, Neal, and Snyder, 2008: 2254–2261).
By the same token, comprehensive emergency management
should deal with both internal emergencies and external
emergencies. It deals not only with routine emergencies but
also with non-routine emergencies (Capri, Ignaccolo, and
Inturri, 2009: 89–94; Reif, Liffers, Norrester, and Peal,
2010: 34–37).
Comprehensive emergency management is a sort of hol-
istic model, especially when considering that this type of
management plays a role in guiding public policy and
research directions. Through comprehensive emergency
management, emergency planning has been practiced and
at the same time related researches have been organized
(Adams, 2008: 26; Dickson, 1992: 82–85). Many nations
have recently made efforts to adopt comprehensive emer-
gency management. As a noteworthy case, the United States
came to nationally institutionalize comprehensive emergency
management when it set up the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) in 1979, during the Carter Adminis-
tration (FEMA. 2010a: 1.8).
According to a review of the literature, the effective-
ness of comprehensive emergency management has been
proved in many countries, as in the aspect of sustainable
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emergency planning during earthquakes in Iran in the
last 20 years (Hosseini, Jafari, Hosseini, Mansouri, and
Hosseinioon, 2009: 661–663) and the comprehensive re-
searches after the mine disaster in Spain in 1998 (Guerrero,
Lozano, and Rueda-Cantuche, 2008: 24–36). In Sri Lanka,
comprehensive emergency management focused on bury-
ing human bodies in dignified places or in dignified ways as
well as on identifying the missing or the dead, particularly
with the help of damage control exercise. In these in-
stances, not only legal troubles were dealt with but psycho-
logical interventions were improved as well (Sumathipala,
Siribaddana, and Perera, 2006: 252–256).
Framework for turning from selective to comprehensive
emergency management in Korea
This article relies heavily on a qualitative content analysis
as a methodology. However, because real practices are
equally important in the field of emergency management,
this article tries to reflect what emergency personnel on
the emergency site have felt. In other words, this study
collected and interpreted related information and data on
selective and comprehensive emergency management via
both qualitative content analysis and practice experiences,
as shown in Figure 1.
To compare selective emergency management and com-
prehensive emergency management in Korea, this study
asked four major questions. First, what kinds of emergency
management has Korea recently practiced? Second, what
applications has Korea utilized for either selective or
comprehensive emergency management? Third, what sig-
nificant cases has Korea produced for either selective or
comprehensive emergency management at each analytical
level? Fourth, is there any way for Korea to shift to compre-
hensive emergency management from its current situation?
Some practitioners insist that selective emergency man-
agement would still be needed for Korea, because of limits
in the related environment, as in the shortage of emergency
funds, the lack of emergency personnel, and limits on other
materials and capabilities (Choi, 2010). However, mainly
because comprehensive emergency management is a sort
of emergency management principle, which should always
be applied in the field of emergency management
(FEMA. 2010b: 2.5-2.6), it is necessary for Korea to def-
initely change any aspect of selective emergency man-
agement to the complex of comprehensive emergency
management.
In the meantime, very few researchers have studied how
to improve selective emergency management or how to
embody comprehensive emergency management for Korea,
even though diverse international scholars have focused on
examining these two management types for their developed
nations or some developed nations. In addition, almost no
systematic study has been conducted to compare selective
and comprehensive emergency management for Korea (Lee
and Cho, 2010: A92-A93; Marietta, 2012: 110–122). Thus,
this article works on the topic as a pioneering study.
This article will maintain that selective emergency
management should be promptly changed to comprehen-
sive emergency management in Korea. In particular, com-
prehensive emergency management has to be practiced at
all levels in the near future. To systematically compare the
two kinds of emergency management, the same three
major components of both types of management, namely,
a) stakeholders, b) the phases of the emergency manage-
ment lifecycle, and c) hazards and impacts, will be exam-
ined at all four analytical levels: 1) central government
level, 2) industry level, 3) community level, and 4) house-
hold level. These four levels were chosen because they
make up the major parts of emergency management
Figure 1 Analytical framework. Sources: FEMA, 2009: 2–2; NEMA, 2014.
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levels, thus showing the whole direction toward which
both selective and comprehensive emergency management
should focus.
Barriers to selective emergency management in Korea
Central government level
Officials of the National Emergency Management Agency
(NEMA) have played dominant roles in deciding important
issues on emergency management at the central govern-
ment level in Korea. As a note, the NEMA will be officially
turned into the National Safety Administration (NSA,
which is tentatively known) by incorporating with the
National Maritime Policy sooner or later. Because the
majority of NEMA personnel consist of firefighters and
civil engineers, they, as public servants, have taken part in
deciding emergency management. Further, parties outside
NEMA, such as representatives from business corpora-
tions, voluntary organizations, and the community, among
others, have not been allowed to participate in the deci-
sion making of NEMA (NEMA, 2014).
An analysis of government documents shows that NEMA
has generally recognized the importance of the four phases
of the emergency management lifecycle. However, NEMA
has realistically focused on supporting the phases of
response and recovery far more than the other phases. For
example, firefighting emphasizes the phase of response,
whereas civil engineering advocates the phase of recovery.
Although some officials have recently advocated support
for the new phase of protection, the major policy of NEMA
continues to support the phases of response and recovery
(Kang, 2008: 1099–1101).
NEMA is formally considered a single national agency
that deals with all kinds of hazards and their related
impacts. However, the institution has substantially sup-
ported firefighting and response to floods due to typhoon.
Because NEMA personnel comprise both firefighters and
civil engineers, it is no wonder that these two kinds of haz-
ards and impacts have been constantly vindicated. More-
over, it is true that these two hazards and impacts are
frequent in Korea.
Based on the above-mentioned facts, it is hardly pos-
sible to maintain that the central government has
adopted comprehensive emergency management. Al-
though NEMA officials have officially proclaimed the
goal of dealing with all kinds of hazards and their
related impacts with equal support for the four phases
of the emergency management lifecycle, the detailed
policy of NEMA shows that it has increasingly moved
toward the aspects of selective emergency manage-
ment. Further, one of the biggest barriers is that both
firefighters and civil engineers have always formed the
backbone of decision making and, therefore, preferred
emergency management policy.
Industry level
Although business leaders in conglomerates such as
Samsung, Hyundai, LG, Doosan, SK, Kia, and Lotte, among
others, have recognized the importance of business
continuity planning (BCP) for their assets via their export
requirement, they have allowed only top managers to
decide the important issues in emergency management. A
similar pattern has been found in the case of small and
medium-sized corporations as a culture, though not many
of them know the meaning of BCP. In short, low-ranking
stakeholders have been excluded from the related decision-
making process. Rather, such stakeholders have purely
worked for emergency teams.
Many corporations have tried to instinctively support the
phases of prevention/mitigation and recovery to increase
their business benefits. In other words, they are willing to
prevent, mitigate, or recover from emergencies around their
business sites, without systematically recognizing the im-
portance of the four phases of the emergency management
lifecycle. This means that they are unwilling to equally
advocate the phases of preparedness and response, based
on their own cost-benefit analysis. In particular, many
business leaders in small and medium-sized corporations
are not aware of the four phases for their emergency
management.
Regardless of corporation size, the majority of business
corporations have tried to set up computer backup
systems for their BCP, although accomplishment of this
task not been complete. They know that the computer
backup system will play a vital role in maintaining their
corporate benefits even under conditions of emergency.
In short, many corporations do not practice modern
BCP but the traditional BCP (Kim, 2009b: 135–138).
Besides, not much has been done in terms of dealing with
other hazards and related impacts, such as industrial
espionage, arson, and earthquake.
Although conglomerates have tried to practice their
own BCP, the majority of small and medium-sized corpo-
rations have not consolidated their emergency manage-
ment. Moreover, conglomerate corporations have shown
many defects in their BCP, such as only the top managers
being involved in decision making in BCP, unequal
support for the phases of preparedness and response, and
ignoring the danger of other hazards and impacts. There-
fore, based on the above-mentioned facts, it is estimated
that industry in Korea has relied heavily on the use of
selective emergency management.
Community level
The community consists of the local government,
community-based organizations (CBO), and voluntary
organizations, to name a few. More stakeholders have
been allowed to take a part in deciding emergency man-
agement issues at the community level than at the
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central government level, mainly because the heads of the
community want to be reelected based on their experience
and ability in deciding on emergency management issues.
Specifically, representatives from voluntary organizations
and CBOs have been frequently invited to take part in the
decision making of the local government. Furthermore,
almost all stakeholders have had no choice but to partici-
pate during an emergency at the scene of the emergency.
The community has traditionally made efforts to support
the phases of response and recovery as a culture, similar to
the situation at the central government level. In one sense,
because the community deals directly with emergencies on
the spot, it has to respond to real emergencies. The com-
munity continues to advocate for the phase of recovery,
considering that the community longs to get back to its
normal life through the recovery phase. In another sense,
because the central government supports the phases of
response and recovery, local governments, as a sub-
government or as a key member of the community, have
followed the same pattern, with the support of voluntary
organizations and CBOs.
Local governments include fire stations, the sections of
Bangjae, and police stations. These three are supposed to
deal with all hazards and impacts in the community: fire
stations fight fires and their impacts, sections of Bangjae
deal with other hazards and their impacts, and police
stations deal with terror and its impacts. Nonetheless,
local governments with the support of voluntary organiza-
tions and CBOs have currently come forward to deal with
two hazards and their impacts, namely, fires and floods
caused by typhoons. The sections of Bangjae literally
mean to work for disaster prevention against all hazards
and impacts, but substantially have worked for civil engin-
eering management against floods caused by typhoon. In
addition, because police stations lack manpower, they have
not been effective in fighting terror in the community.
With the above-mentioned facts in mind, it is very certain
that the community depends upon selective emergency
management. The community has set up a series of emer-
gency operation plans (EOP) and then used them in
particular situations instead of utilizing one comprehensive
EOP. When a fire occurs, the community uses its own
EOP on fire. If floods break out because of typhoon, the
community relies on the EOP regarding floods accompan-
ied by typhoon. When drought hits, the community uses
the third or the fourth EOP. In short, the community’s
establishment of many EOPs to address each hazard and
impact is a typical case of selective emergency management
(McCann, 2009: 331–334).
Household level
In general, almost all members of a family are willing to
participate in dealing with incoming emergency as well as
in making decisions on important emergency issues.
Because the value of filial duty as children has been more
importantly appreciated than that of loyalty to the nation in
Korea, the relationship among family members has
traditionally been very strong as a culture, particularly in
emergency management. It is also true that each household
has well reflected what the others outside the family have
worried about in decision making.
In some aspects, without the appropriate guidance of
the government, many households do not have a good
understanding of the importance of the four phases of
the emergency management lifecycle. Rather, they have
relied on their instincts to respond to and recover from
emergency, even without recognizing the scientific se-
quence of the four phases. However, an increasing
number of households have been informed about the
four phases, and they have subsequently tried to in-
clude them in their emergency management. In so
doing, the household’s support for the phases of pre-
vention/mitigation and preparedness has increased, al-
though incrementally.
Many households understand how to deal with fires and
flooding accompanying a typhoon, because these two have
often happened around them. However, they are at a loss
when dealing with other hazards and their related impact
(Kim, 2009a: 222–226). Thus, when either avian flu or foot
and mouth disease broke out at the start of the twenty-
first century, some residents in rural areas returned home
without being sanitized after visiting the emergency area.
Therefore, the diseases came to spread quickly and widely.
Based on these analyses, it is not possible to evaluate
efforts that households have made to use comprehensive
emergency management, although it is exceptionally true
that all stakeholders have taken part in both decision
making and the first line of defense against emergency.
Households have not played a noteworthy role at all in
equally supporting the four phases of the emergency man-
agement lifecycle and in dealing with all hazards and the
related impact. Thus, it is safe to conclude that households
have depended upon selective emergency management.
Paths to comprehensive emergency management in
Korea
Korea is currently stuck with selective emergency manage-
ment, as shown in Table 1. On the basis of the previous
section on “Barriers to selective emergency management in
Korea,” this evaluation has been double checked with inter-
views of 16 emergency management practitioners, includ-
ing four government officials, four business experts, four
community leaders, and four members of households. Each
of the four groups replied not only to its own level but also
to the other three levels, for objectivity. In short, interview
results have been directly or indirectly reflected to the
simplified evaluation.
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Central government level
Because the guidelines of NEMA have adopted selective
emergency management, it is inevitable for NEMA to, in
substance, change its policy to comprehensive emergency
management. Considering that the central government
has traditionally dominated the public and private rela-
tionship in Korea, it is NEMA that should initiate correct-
ing its biggest barrier to the principle of emergency
management. In particular, NEMA should consider chan-
ging the composition of its human resources by radically
reforming its personnel administration.
In a sense, firefighters and civil engineers, as public
servants, have tried to reflect what other stakeholders
outside NEMA have worried about regarding NEMA’s
decision-making process on emergency management by
holding seminars, conferences, and a complaints window
via the Internet. However, nobody outside NEMA has
ever been allowed to directly take part in deciding on
important issues within NEMA. In addition, considering
the constant proportion of firefighters and civil engi-
neers among NEMA personnel, NEMA has not sincerely
listened to what other stakeholders want. Therefore,
NEMA should immediately allow other stakeholders to
participate in its decision-making process.
NEMA must equally support the phases of prevention/
mitigation and preparedness as well as the phases of re-
sponse and recovery. From a short-term perspective, it
would look better for NEMA to unequivocally advocate
for the phases of response and recovery, because of its
limited resources and capabilities. From a long-term per-
spective, however, it is definitely appropriate for NEMA to
fairly support the phases of prevention/mitigation and
preparedness to achieve the ultimate goal of emergency
management (Bae, 2010: 34–37). The phase of preven-
tion/mitigation will be improved by supporting inspection,
legalization, public parks in potential areas, and so on,
even as the phase of preparedness will be improved by
elaborating the systematic aspect of emergency training.
When other hazards and impacts happen, related catas-
trophe will swoop down Korea, causing terrible havoc.
Mainly because NEMA has not seriously dealt with the
danger of other hazards and impacts except for fire and
flooding caused by typhoons, the potential of human loss
and economic damage may be imminent. Such was the
case when drought hit Gangwon province at the beginning
of 2009: the economic damage was much heavier than what
many had expected. By changing the composition of hu-
man resources in NEMA, the central government should
include other hazards and impacts into its policy domain,
especially in a long-term point of view. New disasters may
then be significantly mitigated, unlike the situation at
present.
Industry level
Industry should realize why it has to rely on comprehen-
sive emergency management, particularly when it is based
on scientific cost-benefit analysis. When industry invests
in comprehensive emergency management, the expected
benefits during emergency will outweigh the costs of
investment before the emergency. When industry hesitates
to invest, the potential cost will be much more than what
it has to invest. Therefore, both conglomerates and small
and medium-sized corporations must shift from the
current selective emergency management to a compre-
hensive one.
Top-bottom decision making does not work effectively
when dealing with a real emergency, because the stake-
holders at the bottom are the ones who deal directly with
emergencies at the location. Thus, stakeholders at the
bottom as well as at the top have to be simultaneously
allowed to participate in the decision-making process in
business corporations. This may be improved primarily by
the top managers’ changing response to who will be the
decision makers for BCP. In other words, top managers
should realize the importance of not some but all stake-
holders for BCP.
Comprehensive emergency management includes well-
designed plans and continuity of emergency preparedness
(Broz, Levin, Mucha, Pelzei, Wong, Persky, and Hershow,
2009: 1499–1500; Deyle, Chapin, and Baker, 2008: 350–353).
Therefore, business corporations should carefully plan BCP
and then equally support the phases of preparedness and
response, as well as those of prevention/mitigation and
recovery. At the same time, they have to continue to support
the four phases of the emergency management lifecycle.
Without continuously investing in the phases of prepared-
ness and response, the existing efforts toward the phases of
Table 1 Simplified evaluation on reality of current emergency management
All levels/three management components a) All stakeholders b) Four phases of emergency
management lifecycle
c) All hazards and impacts
1) Central government level ○ ◑ ◑
2) Industry level ○ ◑ ○
3) Community level ◑ ◑ ○
4) Household level ● ○ ○
Note: ○ = selective emergency management, ◑ = selective + comprehensive emergency management, and ● = comprehensive emergency management.
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prevention/mitigation and recovery will not be smoothly
achieved.
Business corporations should include not only a com-
puter backup system but also methods to deal with indus-
trial espionage, arson, earthquake, and others emergencies
in their BCP. To comprehensively manage emergencies,
industry must take some actions against industrial espion-
age and arson, which frequently occur in modern society.
Moreover, when an earthquake hits, it is easy to guess what
will happen to many corporation buildings, which were not
built based upon construction codes. A strong earthquake
may result in their corporate assets disappearing within a
blink of an eye.
Community level
Many ways may be available for a community to change
from selective to comprehensive emergency management.
Among such choices, one of the most intriguing ones is the
community setting up a single EOP instead of relying on a
series of EOPs and using different EOPs for the respective
emergency. The community has to include all kinds of
emergencies into a single comprehensive EOP after develop-
ing a new EOP framework.
A positive aspect is that every stakeholder in a commu-
nity has successfully participated in fighting emergencies
on the spot. It is also good to recognize that many repre-
sentatives from NGOs have been allowed to take part in
the local government’s decision-making process. This is
really an exceptional case, compared with the case of the
central government. However, the community should
allow not many but all stakeholders to participate in the
local government’s decision making in the future (Kim,
2008: 12–14; Wiseman, Williamson, and Fritze, 2010:
138–142). In addition, this issue should not be decided by
local politics but by the goal of emergency management.
It is necessary for the community to equally support not
only the phases of response and recovery but also those of
prevention/mitigation and preparedness for comprehensive
emergency management. As long as the central govern-
ment unfairly advocates the phases of response and recov-
ery, it will not be easy for local governments under its
influence to attempt to more strongly support the phases of
prevention/mitigation and preparedness. However, repre-
sentatives from NGOs may facilitate a change in this
pattern by officially and equally advocating the four phases
during the local government’s decision-making process.
The community has to include other hazards and
impacts, such as animal diseases, special events, domestic
violence, earthquakes, and so on, as well as fires and floods
caused by typhoons into a single comprehensive EOP. If
done so, particularly with the support of the central govern-
ment or a national initiative, human loss and economic
damage will decrease in the community. In addition, this
matter may be solved by local political leaders by proposing
the importance of dealing with all hazards and impacts for
the entire community (Park, 2009:107–115). Of course, it
will be helpful for their reelection, although they assert that
it is to deviate from the direction of central government.
Household level
Households are the most fundamental units in the field of
emergency management. Without improving their approach
to selective emergency management, the goal of comprehen-
sive emergency management will not be achieved. By
reinforcing every aspect of comprehensive emergency man-
agement, households will play a role in expanding compre-
hensive emergency management into the society via a
bottom-top approach.
The participation of stakeholders inside and outside the
family is positive at the household level. However, the par-
ticipation of all stakeholders should not be the end; rather
it should be a starting point. Based on all stakeholders’
participation, each household needs to professionally
utilize emergency psychology programs. Because such
programs have been unpopular in Korea, each household
has to know how to fully utilize them. For example, a fam-
ily should take good care of its members who have been
victimized, by systematically adopting psychology pro-
grams (Dorji, 2006: 544–546).
It is necessary for households to study the sequence of
the four phases of the emergency management lifecycle as
well as their importance. They can do it in particular via
the Internet, because almost all households have access to
it. The most vulnerable people in emergencies, such as
children or the elderly, have to ask guidance from their
family members on how to use the Internet. In addition,
those family members who have already studied a bit of
comprehensive emergency management need to play an
active role in educating their kin regarding the four phases
of the emergency management lifecycle (Hwang, Park,
Ryu, Lee, Hwang, and Paik, 1999: 177–179). They should
pull the trigger to spread advanced information among
their households.
Households must realize how to deal with other hazards
and related impacts in addition to fires, flood, typhoon,
and their impacts. As the members of family become
mixed geographically via globalization, some new or
foreign diseases such as zoonosis have occurred in house-
holds in Korea. Hence, households should pay attention to
comprehensively battle swine flu, avian flu, foot and mouth
disease, and other animal diseases, as well as other natural
disasters such earthquake, drought, and heavy snowstorm.
Conclusion
This article has tried to show that Korea relies heavily
upon selective emergency management, for the purpose
of suggesting ways to achieve comprehensive emergency
management. In so doing, this article compares selective
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and comprehensive management via three management
elements, namely, stakeholders, the phases of the emer-
gency management lifecycle, and hazards and impacts, at
four analytical units: central government level, industry
level, community level, and household level. The key find-
ing of the study is that Korea should try to shift from select-
ive to comprehensive emergency management.
One of the most significant contributions of this study is
that it provides the framework on how comprehensive
emergency management will operate in Korea. Although
many public officials or scholars have claimed to support
comprehensive emergency management in Korea, almost
nobody has ever substantially succeeded in outlining its
whole picture. Based on related barriers and paths, this
study will play a role in facilitating the real aspects of
comprehensive emergency management in the field of
Korean emergency management.
One of goals that Korea has recently tried to achieve is to
embody comprehensive emergency management in many
respects. Therefore, it is necessary for related researchers to
study how to improve each aspect of comprehensive emer-
gency management to the fullest extent as soon as possible.
This attempt will include at least 12 kinds of researches,
multiplying the above-mentioned three management ele-
ments and four analytical units, similar to the classification
of Table 1 in terms of comprehensive emergency manage-
ment. As a precondition, scholars have to realize how
awkwardly selective emergency management has evolved in
Korea.
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